In the Mideast, Sanctions Alone Won’t Force Khomeinists to Surrender
At the time of this writing, the Trump administration is negotiating a new arrangement with the “Islamic Regime in Iran.”
Concurrently, U.S. Special Envoy to the Middle East Steve Witkoff is meeting is counterparts at different locations, as the general public seeks to understand a strategy which seeks to “convince” the ayatollahs to concede to America.
For the regime has relentlessly confronted America even after having signed a previous Iran Deal, canceled by President Donald Trump in 2018.
So what could be different now?
Is there a new strategy?
This writer is suggesting a new strategy.
To better understand the trajectory of recent geopolitics, it’s worth revisiting what many foreign policy and national security analysts refer to as the “Libyan Model.”
On Dec. 19, 2003, Muammar Gaddafi announced that his regime would end its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) program.
Some analysts argue that this move was prompted by U.S. offers to lift sanctions on Libyan oil — a carrot meant to entice surrender.
However, in my study of the Gaddafi regime, I reached a different conclusion.
As an NBC analyst at the time, I contended that Gaddafi was not swayed by financial incentives. Libya was already rich in oil and gas.
He could have waited out sanctions — just as he had since the 1980s.
What truly pushed him to disarm were the cataclysmic events in Iraq.
The U.S. invasion on March 20 2003 and the rapid fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime shook Gaddafi to the core.
The lesson he took from events was clear, “They did it in Iraq; they could do it in Libya. Let’s cooperate.”
Let’s then not brand it a cash deal; it was a deal for survival — literally.
Even then, Gaddafi entertained the hope that Saddam might escape into exile or lead an underground resistance.
Make no mistake, many radical anti-American regimes shared this illusion.
But no country was willing to shelter Saddam.
Then came the moment that truly terrified Gaddafi: on Dec. 13, 2003, U.S. forces captured Saddam Hussein hiding in a hole in the ground.
The footage of his arrest sent shockwaves across the Mideast.
Just seven days later — on Dec. 19 — Gaddafi unilaterally announced the surrender of his WMD program. No preconditions, no negotiations — just a plea for the U.S. not to destroy his regime.
That same day, while I was at NBC headquarters preparing to comment on Iraq, the Bush administration declared victory. The message was clear: the “Iraq Lesson” was responsible for and had delivered another win.
This shockwave traversed beyond Libya and was felt globally.
In 2004, the U.S. pushed UN Resolution 1559, demanding Syria withdraw its forces from Lebanon. By April 2005, Assad complied.
Similarly, in 2003, Iran announced it was freezing its nuclear program.
Tehran only revived it after President Obama sent a conciliatory letter to Khamenei in June 2009 — leading to what became the weak and dangerous “Iran Nuclear Deal,” announced on July 14, 2015 in Vienna Austria. That agreement destabilized the region, sparked wars, and empowered terror proxies globally.
When we analyze the cases of Saddam in Iraq, Gaddafi in Libya, and the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon, a clear conclusion emerges: Serious negotiations with the Iranian regime must begin after a significant geopolitical setback for Tehran — not before.
Right now, the Islamic Republic is far from military collapse.
It enjoys strategic alliances with China and Russia, dominates Lebanon and Iraq, and holds influence in Yemen.
Under current conditions, Tehran can negotiate for a “minimal civilian nuclear program,” retain its regime structure, preserve its militias, and still secure sanctions relief.
The IRGC and Basij continue to crush dissent and enrich themselves.
If the sole outcome of renewed talks is a vague promise not to build the bomb, we’re simply rewrapping what amounts to “The Obama Deal.”
So, what would it really take to force the Islamic Republic to disarm?
Some may find these suggestions harsh, but history shows that only pressure: military, strategic, and psychological, can compel such a regime to fold.
Here are key steps to keep at the forefront:
- Defeat the Houthis in Yemen.
- The Western coalition, forces in Aden, and a reinvigorated Arab Coalition must eliminate Ansar Allah as a military entity.
- Contain Hezbollah in Lebanon.
- U.S.-backed Lebanese Army units should secure non-Hezbollah areas and sever the group’s links to the outside world.
- Control Syria’s coast. Secure the Alawite regions and take over all ports and airfields on the Syrian Mediterranean.
- Reinforce Kurdish regions.
- Deploy military support and resources to Iraqi and Syrian Kurdistan.
- Elevate the visibility of the Iranian opposition.
- Give full backing to exiled Iranian leaders.
- Simply inviting them to the White House would strike a psychological blow to the regime in Tehran.
Even a credible threat of executing these actions could alter the negotiating dynamic. U.S. envoys would no longer be deal-makers — they’d be negotiating from a position of overwhelming strength, like General Douglas MacArthur accepting Japan’s surrender during the end of World War II in 1945.
The current U.S. approach assumes the regime in Tehran can be swayed by economic benefit. That’s a flawed assumption.
Iran’s ruling elite knows that Western guarantees mean nothing if they lose power. Any meaningful concession could spark a revolt from within.
Under President Obama, the regime was assured protection.
Under President Trump, there are no such guarantees.
His administration offers them only a chance at survival—nothing more. And they know it.
Negotiations must begin not with appeasement, but with resolve.
Tehran must first face setbacks — in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq — and see the rise of a credible, visible, and viable alternative in the Iranian diaspora.
The most powerful gesture of all?
A direct speech from President lDonaldTrump to the people of Iran, from the Oval Office. A pledge to support their quest for freedom and to dismantle the regime of terror in Tehran. That would be the cornerstone of successful diplomacy, and a defining moment for American leadership.
Such a path would ensure victory for the Trump administration — and for the free world.
Dr. Walid Phares served as Donald Trump foreign policy adviser in 2016 and has been the Co-Secretary General of the Transatlantic Parliamentary Group, since 2009. He’s the author of several books including his latest Iran and Imperialist Republic and U.S. Policy. He is cohost of the War and Freedom Podcast. Read Dr. Walid Phares’ Reports — More Here.
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